Archives for October 2015

Update on CFAA Circuit Split: District Courts in 8th Circuit Adopt Minority View, Permitting Claims Where Defendant Exceeds His Authority to Access Computer

We have been watching closely the development of a Circuit split over whether Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) – 18 U.S.C. § 1030 — claims can be brought against persons who have been given authority to access a computer, but then exceed the scope of this authority. The 7th Circuit holds that an employee has accessed his employer’s computer “without authorization” and can be sued under CFAA, if he uses legitimately-acquired access rights to advance an interest that is adverse to his employer. A recent ruling by a District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri, in Lasco Foods, Inc. v. Hall and Shaw Sales, Marketing & Consulting LLC, confirms that courts in the 8th Circuit are lining up behind this minority viewpoint.

The Lasco Foods case involves a common litigation scenario in which an executive has left a company to start a competing business. The defendants, Shaw and Hall, were long-time Lasco sales executives. Both were allegedly provided Lasco-owned laptops for use in company business. According to the complaint, in 2008, Shaw and Hall decided to start a competing business. Both before and after Lasco became aware of this new business, but which they were still Lasco employees, the defendants allegedly “accessed, printed, copied and/or downloaded” a substantial amount of data from their laptops, as well as Lasco’s network. Among this data allegedly was customer contact information stored in Shaw’s Outlook “Contacts” file. Shaw allegedly deleted the Contacts file from his laptop before returning it to Lasco — thus depriving the company of customer information that it had paid to develop. See Lasco Foods, Inc. v. Hall and Shaw Sales, Marketing & Consulting LLC, E.D.Missouri, No. 4:08-cv-01683, Third Amended Complaint (May 15, 2009).

Several state law remedies address what we will call the “absconding executive” situation, including interference with business relations, conversion, and trespass to chattels causes of action. However, companies have often attempted to sue absconding executives under CFAA, as well.

CFAA Section (a)(5) contains three provisions that permit suits against persons who knowingly access a “protected computer” and intentionally or recklessly cause damage. (A protected computer includes any computer which is used in interstate or foreign communication. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). In today’s internet age, it includes just about every computer in the country.) However, each of these three provisions require that the defendant have accessed the computer “without authorization.” Therein lies the rub. As discussed in our September 24 and October 1 posts, the federal courts are divided on when an employee’s access to a computer is “without authorization.” The majority position, which was recently adopted by the 9th Circuit, is that “without authorization” only refers to persons who do not have permission to access the company’s computer in the first place. LVRC Holdings, Inc. v. Brekka, 9th Circuit, Case No. 07-17116 (Sept. 15, 2009). Under this interpretation, Shaw and Hall could not be sued under CFAA, because they had originally received permission from Lasco to access its computers.

We have been watching closely the development of a Circuit split over whether Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) – 18 U.S.C. § 1030 — claims can be brought against persons who have been given authority to access a computer, but then exceed the scope of this authority. The 7th Circuit holds that an employee has accessed his employer’s computer “without authorization” and can be sued under CFAA, if he uses legitimately-acquired access rights to advance an interest that is adverse to his employer. A recent ruling by a District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri, in Lasco Foods, Inc. v. Hall and Shaw Sales, Marketing & Consulting LLC, confirms that courts in the 8th Circuit are lining up behind this minority viewpoint.

The Lasco Foods case involves a common litigation scenario in which an executive has left a company to start a competing business. The defendants, Shaw and Hall, were long-time Lasco sales executives. Both were allegedly provided Lasco-owned laptops for use in company business. According to the complaint, in 2008, Shaw and Hall decided to start a competing business. Both before and after Lasco became aware of this new business, but which they were still Lasco employees, the defendants allegedly “accessed, printed, copied and/or downloaded” a substantial amount of data from their laptops, as well as Lasco’s network. Among this data allegedly was customer contact information stored in Shaw’s Outlook “Contacts” file. Shaw allegedly deleted the Contacts file from his laptop before returning it to Lasco — thus depriving the company of customer information that it had paid to develop. See Lasco Foods, Inc. v. Hall and Shaw Sales, Marketing & Consulting LLC, E.D.Missouri, No. 4:08-cv-01683, Third Amended Complaint (May 15, 2009).

Several state law remedies address what we will call the “absconding executive” situation, including interference with business relations, conversion, and trespass to chattels causes of action. However, companies have often attempted to sue absconding executives under CFAA, as well.

CFAA Section (a)(5) contains three provisions that permit suits against persons who knowingly access a “protected computer” and intentionally or recklessly cause damage. (A protected computer includes any computer which is used in interstate or foreign communication. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). In today’s internet age, it includes just about every computer in the country.) However, each of these three provisions require that the defendant have accessed the computer “without authorization.” Therein lies the rub. As discussed in our September 24 and October 1 posts, the federal courts are divided on when an employee’s access to a computer is “without authorization.” The majority position, which was recently adopted by the 9th Circuit, is that “without authorization” only refers to persons who do not have permission to access the company’s computer in the first place. LVRC Holdings, Inc. v. Brekka, 9th Circuit, Case No. 07-17116 (Sept. 15, 2009). Under this interpretation, Shaw and Hall could not be sued under CFAA, because they had originally received permission from Lasco to access its computers.

Court Finds that File-Sharing Site Can Be Entitled to DMCA Safe Harbor

In another case involving Veoh.com, a federal judge has again rebuffed an attempt by a copyright-holder to claim that the safe harbors of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512) do not protect the video file-sharing site.UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 2008 WL 5423841 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

The Veoh website includes videos supplied by Veoh’s content partners and permits visitors to access large library of commercial television shows and movies. Veoh also permits users to upload their own video content. While Veoh has policies against uploading copyrighted material, copyright holders have alleged that users can, at least temporarily, circumvent Veoh’s measures — with the result that copyrighted music and videos are distributed to other users.

In response to suits from such copyright holders, Veoh has claimed qualified immunity under the DMCA. The DMCA, provides several safe harbors for digital media service providers, including limited immunity for infringing information “residing on systems or networks at direction of users.” (fn1)

In UMG Recordings v. Veoh, copyright holder UMG Recordings, Inc. claimed that Veoh cannot take advantage of this safe harbor because Veoh performs several functions on user-uploaded videos that are not “storage” and are not “undertaken at the direction of a user.” (fn2) These included: (1) creating “Flash-formatted” copies of the uploaded videos; (2) creating “chunked” versions of the uploaded videos; (3) allowing users to access videos via streaming; and (4) allowing users to download whole video files.

In his December 28, 2008 ruling, the judge started with the key assumption that all the activities cited by UMG amounted to “software functions directed toward facilitating access to materials stored at the direction of users.” (fn3) Then, focusing on the precise wording of the DMCA, the judge noted that the provision of the DMCA in question — 17 USC §512(c) — doesn’t state that safe harbor protection is only available for “storing” information. Rather Section 512(c) states that limited immunity is available for infringement “by reason of” or “as a result of” such storage. The judge stated that “when copyrighted material is displayed or distributed on Veoh, it is ‘as a result of’ or ‘attributable to’ the fact that users uploaded the content to Veoh’s servers.” (fn4)